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Abstract
Conﬁdentiality of information is an important aspect that developers should take into consideration when building systems. One
way to achieve conﬁdentiality is to deﬁne access control policies that give authorization rules for allowing users to access resources.
In large organizations, managing policies becomes a complex task. Usually, based on the deﬁned policies, developers would need
to manipulate policies such as composing them and enforcing predeﬁned security constraints. In this paper, we present an algebraic
model for specifying access control policies. It consists of a few number of operators which gives simplicity in specifying policies.
The proposed model enables us to specify policies and enforce predeﬁned security constraints. Furthermore, the model allows us
to combine policies and analyze their effect on predeﬁned constraints. Furthermore, it enables comparing the sensitivity of objects
(e.g. ﬁles) and authority of subjects (e.g. users).
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Many organizations require that their information be stored securely so that it can be accessed only by legitimate
users while others should be denied this access. One way to provide the conﬁdentiality of information is to control its
access and limit it to legitimate users only. Therefore, policies are speciﬁed to describe the allowed access for each
user, and mechanisms are implemented to enforce those policies. In large organizations where several policies are
deﬁned, it becomes more complicated to manage policies. For example, an administrator may need to ensure safety
properties by enforcing predeﬁned constraints. A policy can be seen as a rule which states a privilege of a user to
access a speciﬁc object, while constraints are expressions deﬁned on policies. For example, a constraint can state that
a user should not be able to access two objects belonging to the same conﬂict class.
In this paper, we propose an algebraic model to analyze access control policies. Our model is information algebra1
which is an abstract algebraic system that links several representations of information into one structure. The motiva-
tion of using information algebra is to deﬁne our theory within a setting that is well studied and have an enrich theory.
Furthermore, it enables us to connect different representations of access control policies as all policies are information
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and therefore, can be represented within information algebra. This paper introduces an algebraic model to specify
policies. The model handles policies and set of policies. It allows enforcing constraints and comparing policies as
well as set of policies. Furthermore, it allows from a set of policies to extract and compare the sensitivity of objects
and authority of users.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes information algebra. Section 3 introduces the
algebraic model. Section 4 presents the uses of the model. Section 5 presents related works. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6.
2. Information algebra
Kohlas and Sta¨rk1 introduced information algebra which an abstract algebraic structure ((Φ, ·),(D,,uprise),↓,d,e)
to connect several representations of information such as algebraic speciﬁcations, relational databases, modules, and
constraint systems. It is applied to data cleaning2 and used to analyze information ﬂow3. Information algebra con-
tains a set of information Φ and an operator · to represent combining information. Also, it contains a lattice of
frames (D,,uprise) with an ordering relation  that gives a classiﬁcation to the information. Furthermore, information
algebra contains an operator ↓ to restrict an information to a speciﬁc frame, and an operator d that gives the frame of
an information. Each frame x contains an empty information ex.
3. The proposed algebraic model
In this section, we build a concrete algebraic model to represent access control policies. A policy is an information
which we represent as a function. This function can be written as a set of 2-tuples (i,A) where i is an index used to
classify an information and A is a set such as {(i,A) | i ∈ J ∧ A ⊆ Ai}, where Ai is the set of all elements that are
classiﬁed as i. We use the set Φ to represent the set of all policies that can be deﬁned in an organization, and use the
set Φp to denote the deﬁned policies in an organization. We specify a policy as the privilege given to a user on an
object. Therefore, the set of frames is I = {subject,object,privilege}. To represent Role Based Access Control RBAC
policies, we should add the Role frame to the structure. The lattice D constructed from frames is (P(I),∪,∩) and the
empty information is deﬁned as eJ  {(i, /0) | i ∈ J}. We name the structure (Φp,(Φ,D)) a policy structure.
We present two ways of combining policies. One way relaxes the policies by adding more subjects, objects,
and privileges. For example, an organization may specify that Alice is allowed to read from ﬁle 1, and another
organization speciﬁes that Alice is allowed to write into ﬁle 1. By combining the two policies, we get the policy
{(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read,write})} that allows Alice to read and write into ﬁle 1. We
deﬁne this operator as ϕ ·ψ  {(i,A) | i ∈ I ∧ A = ϕ(i)∪ψ(i)}. Usually, we represent it as ϕψ (omit the dot).
Another way of combining policies is to restrict the privileges of the two policies by considering the common ones
only. For example, by combining the policy {(subject, {Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1,ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{read})} with the
policy {(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}), (privilege,{read, write})} we get a more restricted policy that allows
Alice to read from ﬁle 1 {(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read)}}. We deﬁne this combination as
ϕ ∗ψ  {(i,A) | i ∈ I ∧ A = ϕ(i)∩ψ(i)}.
We also deﬁne a binary operator ↓: Φ×D → Φ to extract a part of an information that belongs to a speciﬁc
frame as ϕ↓J  IJ ;ϕ where J is a frame and ϕ is an information such that J ∈ D and ϕ ∈ Φ. For example, let
ϕ = {(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read})} and J = {subject}. Then ϕ↓J = {(subject,{Alice})}.
It is proved in4 that ((Φ, ·),(D,,uprise),↓,d,e) is an information algebra. Therefore, (Φ, ·) has a natural order re-
lation ≤ such that ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ ϕ ·ψ = ϕ . We use this relation to compare policies based on their ﬂexibility. For
example, let ϕ and ψ be two policies such that ϕ = {(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read})}, ψ =
{(subject,{Alice, Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read})}. Here, ϕ is more restricted than ψ as ψ allows Alice
and Bob to read from ﬁle 1 while ϕ allows only Alice. Formally, ϕ ≤ ψ because ϕψ = ψ .
An information can be a composite policy. For example, the information {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 2}),
(privilege,{read,write})} is a composite policy that contains two policies. The ﬁrst allow Bob to read from ﬁle 2 and
the second allow Bob to write into ﬁle 2. We call a policy elementary if the set associated with each classiﬁcation
is singleton i.e. elementary(ϕ) iff ∀(ψ,χ | ψ,χ ∈ Φ : ψ  χ ⇒ ψχ  ϕ ). From a composite policy, we can
extract all its elementary policies as singleton(ϕ) = {ψ | elementary(ψ) ∧ ψ ≤ ϕ}. For example, let the policy ϕ =
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{(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{read, write})}. Then, singleton(ϕ) = { {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{
ﬁle 2}), (privilege,{read})} , {(subject,{Bob}),(object,ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{write})} }. This is the only set that can
be obtained from singleton(ϕ) as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A composite policy is a product of a unique set of elementary policies.
Proof. The proof uses the deﬁnition of set inequality, deﬁnition of singleton(ϕ), and propositional logic identities.
Usually, a set of policies is deﬁned to control the access to objects in an organization. These policies state the
privileges of subjects on objects. This is what we denote byΦp. For example, the following set contains three policies
which can be deﬁned in an organization to state that Alice is allowed to write into ﬁle 1, while Bob is allowed to write
into ﬁle 1 and read and write into ﬁle 2. {{(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{write})},{(subject,{Bob}),
(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{write})}, {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{read, write})} }.
Based on the primitive operators deﬁned on policies, we deﬁne the function isThereAPolicy(N ,ϕ) ∃(ψ | ψ ∈
Φp : ϕ ≤ ψ ). This function checks the existence of a policy ψ within the policy structure N = (Φp,(Φ,D)) that
is more ﬂexible than ϕ . The set Φ is the set of all possible policies, and Φp is the set of deﬁned policies in an
organization. We also deﬁne a function extract on the top of our algebraic model to extract all the policies satisfying
a speciﬁc condition. We deﬁne extract as extract(N , J, ϕ)  {ψ↓J | J ∈ D ∧ ψ ∈ Φp ∧ ϕ ≤ ψ ∧ J ⊆ d(ψ)}.
This function extracts pieces of information fromN that contains ϕ and restricts them to the frame J. For example,
we can extract all the policies speciﬁed on the user Alice in an organization that has the policy structure N as
extract(N , {subject,object,privilege}, {(subject,{Alice})}). Also, we can extract the name of all subjects that are
allowed to write into ﬁle 1 as extract(N , {subject}, {(object,{ﬁle 1})},{(privilege,{write})}).
4. Usage of the model
4.1. Authorization
Once an organization deﬁnes its own policies, it needs to control the access to its resources. By using our math-
ematical model, we can control such access by checking the ability of a subject to access an object. We represent
the access request as an information. For example, the request of Bob to read from ﬁle 1 can be represented as
{(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read)}}. We can check whether a request is accepted or denied by
checking the existence of the policy in the policy structure of that organization. We can verify the existence by us-
ing the isThereAPolicy(N ,ϕ) function, where ϕ = {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read})}. This
function checks the existence of a policy, within the deﬁned policies in an organization, that allows the request ϕ .
4.2. Enforcing constraints
An administrator may need to enforce predeﬁned policies to ensure safety properties. We deﬁne a policy as an
information. Whereas, we express constraints using logical operators ∧ ,∨,⇒,¬ and the proposed model. Below, we
present examples of enforcing constraints.
Example 1. An organization can state a constraint as any privilege is given to Alice should also be given to Bob.
To enforce the constraints, we can perform the following check ψ ≤ ϕ ⇒ χ ≤ ϕ where ϕ is the policy to be deﬁned in
the organization, ψ = {(subject,{Alice})} and χ = {(subject,{Bob})}.
In this example, we can enforce a constraint by checking only the new deﬁned policies. However, enforcing some
constraints require checking the policy knowledge as shown in the following example.
Example 2. An organization can state a constraint as Alice is allowed to read from ﬁle 1 or ﬁle 2 but not both. To en-
force the constraints, we can perform the following check (χ ≤ ϕ ⇒ψ  ϕ ∧ ¬isThereAPolicy(N ,{subject,object,
privilege},ψ))∨ (ψ ≤ϕ⇒ χ ϕ ∧ ¬isThereAPolicy(N ,{subject,object,privilege},χ))where ϕ is the policy to be
deﬁned in the organization,ψ = {(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read)}}, and χ = {(subject,{Alice}
),(object,{ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{read)}}.
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4.3. Manipulating policies
The proposed algebraic model allows combining and comparing pieces of information as presented in Section 3.
The following proposition shows the effect of composing pieces of information on the satisfaction of predeﬁned
constraints.
Proposition 2. Let ϕ,ψ and χ be policies. Then,
1. ϕ ≤ ψ ∧ ϕ ≤ χ ⇒ ψ  χ 2. ϕ ≤ ψ ⇒ ϕ ≤ ψχ 3. ϕ ≤ ψ ⇒ ϕ ∗χ ≤ ψ
Proof. The proof uses propositional logic identities, and deﬁnitions of information ≤ and ·
Identity 1 distinguishes between constraints by showing the existence of a policy ϕ satisfying a constraint ϕ ≤ ψ
and not satisfying the other ϕ ≤ χ . Identity 2, when we consider the policy as ϕ , states that a policy satisfying a
constraint ϕ ≤ ψ is also satisfying a relaxation of that constraint ϕ ≤ ψχ . Identity 3, when we consider the policy
as ϕ , shows that if a policy satisﬁes a constraint ϕ ≤ ψ then, its restriction ϕ ∗χ satisﬁes the same constraint as well.
Therefore, relaxing a constraint or restricting a policy would not affect the satisfaction of the deﬁned constraints.
4.4. Manipulating set of policies
There can be more than one way to represent a set of policies. For example, the policies stating that Alice is al-
lowed to write into ﬁle 1, while Bob is allowed to write into ﬁle 1 and read and write into ﬁle 2 can be represented as
{ {(subject,{Alice}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{write})} , {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{write}
)} , {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{read, write})} }. The same policies can be represented also as
{ {(subject,{Alice, Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 1}),(privilege,{read})} , {(subject,{Bob}),(object,{ﬁle 2}),(privilege,{
read, write})} }. One may ask how to compare between two given set of policies. Let Φp be a set of policies. We
deﬁne Singleton(Φp) = {ϕ | ψ ∈Φp ∧ ϕ ∈ singleton(ψ)}. Let Φp and Ψp be two sets of policies. We say that Φp
and Ψp are equivalent Φp ≡Ψp iff Singleton(Φp) = Singleton(Ψp). Therefore, we can compare a set of policies de-
spite their different representation. We say the set of policies Φp is more restricted thanΨp and denote it by Φp Ψp
iff Singleton(Φp)⊆ Singleton(Ψp).
In some situations, we need to combine sets of policies deﬁned in several places. In the following deﬁnition,
we identify two ways to combine policies. Let Φp and Ψp be two sets of policies. We deﬁne the operators unionsq and
 as Φp unionsqΨp  Φp ∪Ψp and Φp Ψp  Singleton(Φp)∩Singleton(Ψp). The operator unionsq is an expanding way of
combining policies of two organizations which permits an authorization by ΦpunionsqΨp if the authorization is permitted
by Φp or by Ψp. The operator  is a restricted way to combine policies which permits an authorization by ΦpΨp if
the authorization is permitted by both Φp and Ψp.
4.5. Comparing the sensitivity of objects and authority of subjects
In some cases, a reverse engineering method is required to obtain a hierarchy of objects sensitivity or subjects
authority based on the already deﬁned policy in an organisation. Such comparison between objects or subjects is
applicable within the proposed model by using the function extract and the relation . For example, ﬁle 1 is more
sensitive than ﬁle 2 if any access is permitted on ﬁle 1 is also permitted on ﬁle 2. We can verify that using our model as
extract(N , {subject,object,privilege}, {(object,{ﬁle 1})}) extract(N , {subject,object,privilege}, {(object,{ﬁ-
le 2})}). Similarly, we can compare subjects. For example, Alice has more authority than Bob if extract(N , {subject,
object,privilege}, {(subject,{Bob})}) extract(N , {subject,object,privilege}, {(subject,{Alice})})
5. Related work and discussion
Several methods are available in the literature for specifying and analyzing access control policies. Fisler et al. 5
presented a formal way to verify policies written in xacml language related to known properties with the use of
the software suite Margrave. Crampton6 developed a set-based speciﬁcation scheme for authorization constraints
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in role-based access control systems and suggested an enforcement model. Adi et al. 7 used context expressions for
specifying policies at different levels of abstraction, and deﬁned a type system to detect conﬂicts. Sabri and Obeid8
applied temporal defeasible logic to specify policies. Other researches related to access control policies include9
that performed policy testing to identify potential security ﬂaws and bugs, the work of10 that presented an approach
to assist developers in automatically extracting access control rules from natural language documents, and11 that
integrated attribute-based policies into relationship-based access control for access control in online social networks.
Algebraic methods were introduced in the literature for the analysis of access control policies. For example, the
paper of Bonatti et al. 12 proposed an algebra for composing policies. Li and Wang13 introduced an algebra for the
speciﬁcation of high level policies that combine requirements of users’ attributes with requirements of the number
of users. Also, they studied the potential mechanisms to enforce these policies and the complexity related to policy
analysis and enforcement. Wijesekera and Jajodia14 presented a propositional algebra to model access control policy
operators such as union, intersection, sequential composition, etc.
The presented methods does not provide a way of comparing the authority of subjects or sensitivity of objects based
on the speciﬁed policies as we have in this paper. Furthermore, our model provides means for comparing the ﬂexibility
of policies and set of policies as as well as composing them and enforcing constraints. Although we represent a simple
model of access control in this paper, we believe that our model can be extended to other models such as RBAC within
the information algebra structure which enables us to inherit all the theories deﬁned in this paper.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an algebraic model to specify and handle policies. We gave a formal deﬁnition to a
policy. Also, we distinguished between elementary and composite policies. Furthermore, we deﬁned operators on
policies and set of policies and proved their properties. The main advantages of the proposed model is that it consists
of few operators and it is comprehensive. It enables us to manipulate policies and sets of policies by combining and
comparing them, compare the sensitivity of objects and the authority of subjects, enforce security constraints, and
control user requests to access resources. We developed a prototype tool implemented using Haskell programming
language for specifying and manipulating policies. But for space limitation, we were not able to present it. As a future
work we aim to extend the model to specify RBAC and ABAC policies.
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